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FINANCIAL INSTITUTION INTERLOCKS AFTER
THE BANKAMERICA CASE
ARTHUR

H.

TRAVERS, JR.

Professor of Law, Colorado University School of Law
It appears that we have entered a chaotic time in the area of interlocks
among financial institutions. Not only are traditional financial institutions
expanding the range of their services, but new entrants-even new types
of entrants-have begun competing with old line institutions. As regulatory barriers continue to fall, the line between a financial institution
and other types of businesses will become increasingly difficult to discern.
Among others whose lives have been complicated by these developments is the antitrust lawyer who is asked to comment on an interlock
between (or among) two or more firms, at least one of which is a financial
institution. He or she needs some familiarity with the traditional antitrust
prohibitions, the Depository Institution Management Interlocks Act,'
and with any specialized statutes dealing with interlocks that may have
a bearing on the situation. The recent decision of the Supreme Court
in BankAmerica Corp. v. United States2 should provide some guidance. The
purpose of this paper is to provide an introduction to the law governing
financial institution interlocks with particular emphasis on the impact of
the BankAmerica case.
It should be noted at the outset that the broad category of "financial
institutions" includes banks, thrift institutions that compete with banks
in seeking deposit accounts and in other ways, and other types of firms
that also may compete with banks and thrift institutions, such as brokerage houses or insurance companies. Whether a particular distinction,
e.g., between a savings and loan association and a bank, should be made
will depend upon the specific question being addressed.
I. SECTION 8 OF THE CLAYTON ACT
Although a number of provisions of the traditional antitrust statutes
may apply to interlocks among financial institutions, the most important
' 12 U.S.C. §§ 3201 et seq. (Supp. IV 1980).
103 S. Ct. 2266 (1983).

2
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provisions are to be found in Section 8 of the Clayton Act.' The first
three paragraphs of that section have for 70 years prohibited some, but
not all, interlocks among banks. At present,4 these paragraphs prohibit
(subject to seven enumerated exceptions) a director, officer or employee
from serving simultaneously any member bank of the Federal Reserve
System and any other national or state bank, banking association, savings
bank or trust company.
Since approximately 60 percent of all banks are not members of the
Federal Reserve System, a considerable number of potential interlocks
among banks would not be affected by these provisions and, obviously,
interlocks among financial institutions that are not banks are outside of
these provisions. However, the fourth paragraph of Section 8 provides:
No person at the same time shall be a director in any two or more corporations, any one of which has capital, surplus and undivided profits
aggregating more than $1,000,000, engaged in whole or in part in
commerce, other than banks, bankingassociations,trust companies and common
carrierssubject to the [Interstate Commerce Act]... if such corporations
are or shall have been theretofore, by virtue of their business and
location of operation, competitors, so that the elimination of competition
by agreement between them would constitute a violation of any of the
provisions of any of the antitrust laws.'
This provision would apply to any interlocks among competing financial
institutions of the requisite size, provided none of the linked firms was
a bank. It was also generally agreed that it would not apply to an interlock
among competing banks that escaped the ban of the first three paragraphs.' It was an open question, however, whether the paragraph applied to an interlock 'between two competing financial institutions, one
of which was a bank and the other of which was not.
To get that question answered, the government brought several test
cases in 1975 against ten corporations and five individuals. Each of the
individuals served as a director of an insurance company and as a director
of a bank and/or a bank holding company. Both sides moved for summary
judgment in the district court, having first stipulated to the existence of
all the facts otherwise necessary to make Section 8 applicable if bank/
nonbank interlocks were not exempted from it. The district court ruled
15 U.S.C. § 19 (1976).
As enacted, the first three paragraphs forbade interlocks among banks "organized
under the laws of the United States" and other such banks or banks organized under state
law. See 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES
1063-64 (Kintner ed. 1978).
1The emphasis is that supplied by Chief Justice Burger in his opinion in BankAmerica
Corp v. United States, 103 S. Ct. at 2266, 2268 (1983).
6 It appears that the government did argue that the "other than banks" language should
be read as exempting only those interlocks covered by the first three paragraphs, however.
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that the fourth paragraph of Section 8 applied only if none of the interlocked corporations was a bank and dismissed the suit.7 The Ninth Circuit, in a two-to-one decision, reversed. The majority held that interlocks
were exempted from this provision only if both (or all) of the interlocked
companies were banks.'
The district court regarded the language as clear and unambiguous:
the paragraph required that each of the interlocked corporations be
"other than a bank." The district court did, however, support its view
with pre- and post-enactment aids, like legislative history. The Ninth
Circuit found all of this data sufficiently ambiguous to permit it to rely
upon some general canons of antitrust constructions: it found a strong
policy against horizontal interlocks and relied as well upon the strong
presumption against implied exemptions from the antitrust laws.
By a five-to-three vote, the Supreme Court reversed.' Justice Burger's
opinion adopted much of the reasoning of the district court. He found
the district court's reading to be the most "natural." He found this reading
reinforced by the structure of the section (and the paragraph), by 60
years of popular and administrative construction, and by the internal
legislative history. In dissent, Justice White found the statutory language
far from clear; he thought the legislative history conclusive for the government's view.
The immediate effect of the decision is to enlarge the no-man's land
in Section 8, to expand the class of interlocks not covered by the section.
Beyond this, I am doubtful that the case will have much impact on general
antitrust doctrine. Both opinions are likely to be of more interest to the
student of statutory interpretation than to the antitrust lawyer. Having
said that, I would like to mention a couple of features of the Chief
Justice's opinion. As was noted, the Ninth Circuit saw a strong policy
against horizontal interlocks. The ChiefJustice discerned no such policy;
he saw instead a "pattern of specific and limited regulation." He contrasted the section as enacted with the prohibitions that had been proposed and concluded that "rather than enacting a broad scheme to ban
all interlocks between potential competitors, Congress approached the
problem of interlocks selectively, limiting both the classes of corporations
and the kinds of interlocks subject to regulation.""0
United States v. Crocker National Corp., 422 F. Supp. 686 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
8 United States v. Crocker National Corp., 656 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1981).

9BankAmerica Corp. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2266 (1983). justices Blackmun,
O'Connor, Rehnquist and Stevens joined justice White in dissent. justice Powell took no
part.
10 Id.at 2270.
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Furthermore, Chief Justice Burger showed a good deal of solicitude
about those persons who had served on boards of banks and insurance
companies in reliance upon "what was universally perceived as plain
statutory language." One may infer that the Chief Justice does not think
these persons would be warned by any "inherent wrongness" of the
interlock. Finally, I think the dissent has the better of the argument
regarding the clarity of the statutory language. I would guess that the
majority regards its reading as the most natural because at some level it
sees little value in a sweeping prohibition of interlocks.
II. THE SHERMAN ACT AND SECTION 5 OF
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT
Justice White's dissenting opinion argues that the majority's holding
exempts "this entire species from any regulation whatsoever, even though
such interlocks undisputably may have serious anticompetitive consequences directly contrary to the policies of our antitrust laws."" I think
this is a misconception although ChiefJustice Burger does not callJustice
White on it. Interlocks not within Section 8 are not immune from attack
under the Sherman Act or the Federal Trade Commission Act.' 2 At a
minimum there must be involved some agreement between the director
and each corporation. Often there would be an underlying agreement
among the interlocked corporations to share a director. One might argue
(1) that either of these overt agreements constitutes a restraint of trade,
or (2) that either of these overt agreements is conclusive evidence of
some covert agreement to restrain trade. For example, the sharing of a
director by competing corporations might make
sense only as a device
3
agreement.1
price-fixing
hidden
a
policing
for
In practice, however, Section 1 is rarely invoked against interlocking
directorates. 4 The reason is not hard to discover. Unless an interlock
among competing corporations could be characterized as per se unlawful,
an attacker would have to establish that the particular arrangement had,
in fact, restrained trade. If, for example, the interlock had been an
"Id. at p. 2276.
See generally Travers, Interlocks in CorporateManagement and the Antitrust Laws, 46 TEX.
L. REV. 819 (1968); ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 10, INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES UNDER SECTION 8 OF THE CLAYTON ACT (1984) [hereinafter cited as ABA
INTERLOCK MONOGRAPH].
11 The temptation of each cartel member to "chisel" on his co-conspirators often requires
some such policing device. Many of the information exchange cases have been thought to
involve devices to protect the cartel against destruction by centrifugal forces. See L. SUL-

LIVAN, ANTITRUST

265-68 (1977).

14A rare and unsuccessful effort is United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y.
1953).
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effective device for policing an agreement to fix prices or restrict output,
it is likely that an econometric study could reveal what had happened.
But in such a case the interlock would be a secondary consideration.
Although dissolving the interlock would be an important part of the
relief should the covert agreement be proved, the agreement, and not
the interlock, would be the focus of the litigation. The case would not
differ much from most other cases in which it is sought to establish the
existence of a price-fixing agreement by circumstantial evidence.
This would change, of course, were the Supreme Court to espouse a
per se rule for interlocks among competitors. This seems a remote possibility. In the first place, the attitude of the majority in BankAmerica (if
I have read it right) would not be hospitable to this step. More generally,
the Court has not been entirely consistent recently in charting the boundary between the domain of the rule of reason and that of the per se rule.
In GTE Sylvania, 5 Justice Powell suggested that an economic test would
be used: if it were possible to say about a class of arrangements that they
were anticompetitive (output restricting) and not procompetitive (output
enlarging), then any arrangement that was a member of that class would
be illegal per se. Conversely, if it were necessary to evaluate the arrangement in question to determine whether it was anti- or procompetitive,
then the rule of reason would be employed. 6 In cases like BMI17 and
Maricopa County,'8 the Court has been more inclined to regard the per
se rule as something that has evolved historically from the Court's decisions-as simply another name for stare decisis.
I have a hard time seeing a per se rule for horizontal interlocks under
either approach. Clearly there is no solid precedent with respect to interlocks. I could imagine a determination, under the economic approach,
that some horizontal interlocks are inherently anticompetitive. The trick
would be in specifying the conditions that must be present for this conclusion to be drawn. The sharing of a director by two highly diversified
firms, both of which are minor factors in the single market in which they
compete, might well be procompetitive. But the logic of a per se analysis
requires that the class to which it applies be clearly defined. All horizontal
interlocks would be too large a class, but I find it difficult to define a
subclass a priori.
The lesson seems to be that a director and his interlocked corporations
have little to fear from the Sherman Act, unless they have otherwise
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
'6 See National Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
7Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
's Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
'3
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agreed to restrain trade. In that case, they have more than the interlock
to worry about.
A complete treatment of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act would take us too far afield, but a few observations may be of use.
There are entangled here both substantive and jurisdictional issues. Banks
not being subject to the FTC's jurisdiction, we may set aside bank/bank
interlocks. In the PerpetualSavings and Loan 9 case, the Commission faced
an interlock between a bank and a savings and loan association. It decided
that, although banks were not subject to itsjurisdiction, thrift institutions
were. Of course, it needs jurisdiction over but one of the interlocked
corporations in order to achieve the dissolution of the interlock. The
FTC also ruled that the interlock violated Section 8 of the Clayton Act.
By adopting this approach, it avoided the necessity of deciding whether
interlocks not prohibited by either Section 8 or by the Sherman Act
might nevertheless violate Section 5.
The FTC's ruling on the jurisdictional question was overturned when
Congress amended Section 5 to exempt savings and loan associations
from thejurisdiction of the Commission. z" The Commission then vacated
its order.2 1 The Commission's construction of Section 8 was rejected in
the BankAmerica case. The Commission may still employ the Perpetual
case's approach to its jurisdiction to attack any interlock involving one
corporation subject to Section 5, but now it must do so by either employing the Sherman Act or expanding the reach of Section 5 beyond
the other Acts.
III. THE DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS MANAGEMENT
INTERLOCKS ACT
The passage of the Depository Institutions Management Interlocks
Act in 197822 has reduced the importance of the traditional antitrust
laws, but it has not rendered the old learning entirely obsolete. There
are three reasons for this.
First, although repeal of Section 8 as it applied to depository institutions
was initially proposed, the Act did not repeal Section 8 or any other
antitrust law. It is conceivable that, for example, a bank/bank interlock
would run afoul of both the Act and the first three paragraphs of Section
11Perpetual Savings & Loan Ass'n, 90 F.T.C. 608 (1977), vacated, 94 F.T.C. 401 (1979).
2
°Act of July 23, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-37, 93 Stat. 95 (1979), codified in 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
21 94 F.T.C. 401 (1979).
22 12 U.S.C. §§ 3201 et seq. (Supp. IV 1980).
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8. In such a case, one might think that the new Act should suffice. But
the new Act is to be enforced primarily by the appropriate federal regulatory agency. Judicial action to enforce the Act by the Attorney General
must be preceded by a referral by the appropriate agency.23 This requirement of a referral was added to the bill during the legislative process; as introduced, the Act allowed the Justice Department to proceed
on its own initiative.2
If, however, an interlock also violates the antitrust laws, there is no
explicit requirement of a referral though an argument for reading in
such a requirement as a way of preventing an inconsistency between the
statutes is certainly possible. Private actions against interlocks that also
violate the antitrust laws remain a theoretical possibility although the
requirement that such a private plaintiff demonstrate that he has been
injured by the anticompetitive activity complained of diminishes the
practical importance of this threat.
Second, the Act "grandfathers" existing interlocks until 1988, but only
if they are not in violation of Section 8 of the Clayton Act. The decision
in BankAmerica thus expands considerably the class of interlocks protected
by this grandfather clause. If an interlock were to be found to violate
the Sherman Act, on the other hand, the protection of the grandfather
clause would still be available.
Third, there are interlocks that are not prohibited even by the expanded provisions of the new Act that might nevertheless be attacked
under the traditional statutes. The new Act prohibits "management official" interlocks between unaffiliated "depository institutions" or "depository holding companies" that meet the size and location requirements
of the Act. 25 As defined, a "depository institution" would be virtually any
type of bank or thrift institution. The Federal Reserve Board staff has
already rendered an opinion that an industrial loan company, although
technically not one of the types listed in the definition of "depository
institution," should be so considered since it offered investment certificates analogous to savings deposits, made various types of loans, and
was examined annually for soundness. It is too early to know whether
this commodious approach will be followed, but it would appear that
interlocks may develop among depository institutions and firms that
simply cannot be so classified, even if a very expansive view of the Act
23 12

U.S.C. § 3206 (Supp. IV 1980).

24See Yoerg, Report to the Section 7 (Clayton Act) Committee of the Antitrust Section

of the American Bar Association on the Present Status of Financial Institution Interlocks,
n. 40 and accompanying text (March, 1984).
25 12 U.S.C. §§ 3202, 3203.

1074

FINANCIAL INSTITUTION INTERLOCKS

is taken. These escape the prohibitions of the Act, but the traditional
antitrust laws may still be applicable.
Turning now to the Act itself, the term "management official" is defined to mean "an employee or officer with management functions, a
director (including an advisory or honorary director), a trustee of a
business organization under the control of trustees, or any person who
has a representative or nominee serving in any such capacity ... "26 "Person" evidently includes a corporation or other business organization; 7
hence, the statute purports to answer one question-the nominee question-that had been vexing under Section 8.
This broad definition goes considerably beyond the fourth paragraph
of Section 8 but not the first three paragraphs which apply to interlocks
effected through a "director, officer, or employee." While it may be said
in favor of a broad definition that the sharing of high ranking management personnel by competitors poses the same threat to competition as
the sharing of directors, the Act does restrict the pool of available outside
directors. Moreover, the question of whether a given employee has "management functions" is not easily answered in an age in which every sales
manager with two subordinates is styled a "marketing executive." There
has been some activity by the regulatory agencies in this area, but not
much.
Had the Act prohibited interlocks among "competing" depository institutions, it would have been incumbent on lawyers and judges to determine the relevant product and geographic markets to ascertain whether
certain interlocked firms were, in fact, competitors. The drafters did not
adopt this approach. As remarked above, it attempted to resolve the
question of the relevant product market by its definitions of "depository
institutions" and "depository holding companies" although basic analysis
is still useful on the edges. It also attempted to provide at least a partial
solution of the geographic market question. A depository institution or
depository holding company having total assets exceeding one billion
dollars may not share a management official with any institution or
holding company having total assets in excess of five hundred million
dollars.28 Presumably, geographic location is an incidental detail in the
case of institutions of such magnitude.
So far as smaller institutions are concerned, the interlock is forbidden
only if they have offices in the same "primary metropolitan statistical
12 U.S.C. § 3201(4).
No such definition appears in the Act, but the phrase "natural person" is used when
the evident interest is to confine the scope of the term. See 12 U.S.C. § 3201(4).
28 12 U.S.C. § 3203.
26

2'7
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area, the same metropolitan statistical area, or the same consolidated
metropolitan statistical area that is not comprised of designated primary
metropolitan areas as defined by the Office of Management and Budget,"
or, "in the case of depository institutions29with less than $20,000,000 in
assets," the same "city, town, or village.
The Act defines an "office" as "either a principal office or a branch."
This elaboration, however, applies only with reference to a depository
institution and not to a depository holding company. Exactly what will
qualify as a branch remains to be seen. Presumably it would not include
a robot teller machine, although3 0 these have been held to be branches in
some states for some purposes.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have not even discussed some of the specialized statutory bans on
interlocks. Even without these it should be apparent that the law respecting financial institution interlocks has become moderately complex.
In part, this seems to be due to our inability to decide exactly how we
feel about interlocks in general and interlocks among financial institutions in particular. One hopes that the subcommittee's monograph on
interlocks 3 produced under Norman Yoerg's leadership, will be the
impetus for a discussion of the entire area.
MR. YOERG: Our next speaker will be Bill McLeod, who presently is
the Director of the Chicago Regional Office of the FTC. He was the
attorney advisor to Chairman Miller of the FTC at the time of the BorgWarner case. His topic today is "Interlocks at the Federal Trade Commission: Room for Reason in a 'Per Se' Statute?"

12 U.S.C. § 3202.
See 12 U.S.C. § 3201(5). With respect to a holding company, the notion of a branch
office loses its meaning. It should be noted that the robot teller cases have been decided
under state branch banking laws that are anticompetitive. The effect of such a ruling
under the Act would also be anticompetitive.
11ABA INTERLOCK MONOGRAPH, supra note 12.
50

